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Abstract 
 
The creation of today’s European legal order is usually traced back to a set of remarkable decisions 
made by the European Court of Justice in 1963 and 1964. Where, however, did the content of those 
judgments come from? After all, the doctrines advanced by the Court in its Van Gend en Loos, Costa v. 
ENEL, and Dairy Products decisions were not set out in the Treaty of Rome itself. This paper uses 
writings by French judge Robert Lecourt to show how the legal philosophy that Lecourt had developed 
before his appointment to the Court, in his scholarship on French property law, can be directly related 
to the fundamental doctrines that the Court created after his appointment, indicating that one of the major 
objectives of the dominant faction on the Court in 1963 and 1964 was a comprehensive rejection of any 
form of reciprocal or retaliatory self-help between the European states.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Today’s European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its center, provides the authoritative 
settlement of disputes between states, European institutions, firms, and individuals within the European 
Union (‘EU’). Particularly when compared to other treaty-based dispute settlement systems, the EU’s 
legal system is widely recognized as remarkably effective, intrusive, and innovative. The European legal 
order has, indeed, come a long way since the Treaty of Rome established the then European Economic 
Community in 1958, and, in Article 164, provided for a Court of Justice “to ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed.”1 
 The particular strength of the European legal order is often understood to derive from a set of 
‘revolutionary’ doctrines first established by the Court of Justice in 1963 and 1964 (Weiler 1991). These 
doctrines, most prominently the doctrines of the direct effect and the supremacy of European law, but 
also the comprehensive rejection of self-help enforcement mechanisms by the European states, 
distinguished the then emerging European legal order from general international law, and provided for 
private individuals and domestic courts to take a direct role in enforcing European obligations within 
their national legal orders. Over time, as these doctrines were extended by the Court of Justice to a wider 
range of scenarios, and as they came to be understood and accepted (not without hesitations) by policy-
makers, courts, and private actors within the European states, these early decisions of the Court provided 
the foundations of European law as we now know it.  
Such is the identification of the essential features of the European legal order with the doctrines that the 
Court of Justice announced in its decisions in 1963 and 1964 that it is frequently necessary to be 
reminded that these doctrines were not set out in the Treaty of Rome. Where then did the fundamental 
doctrines of European law come from?  
At one level, the simplest answer to that question is that these doctrines were invented by the Court of 
Justice, interpreting the sparse provisions of the Treaty in the light of the disputes that came before it. 
At another level, such an answer merely restates the question: where, then, did the contents of these 
European Court decisions come from? Apart from a variety of facilitating background conditions, it is 
at this point that progress has stalled, not least because the Court’s judgments are presented as 
unanimous, its internal deliberations are secret, and little information has emerged concerning the 
contributions of particular individual judges to the judgments produced by the Court as a whole.  
There is much at stake here. The EU is one of the most extraordinary treaty organizations in 
contemporary world politics, providing binding rules for now twenty-eight European states and several 
hundred million European citizens, in a wide variety of issue-areas. Yet the EU itself remains somewhat 
mysterious and ill-defined, clearly distinct from more common forms of international organization but 
comprehensively lacking the ‘Weberian’ monopoly of legitimate violence that is the characteristic 
definition of a state. Instead, the EU is most often understood as a ‘Community of Law’, a 
Rechtsgemeinschaft, the German word that captures the special role of law and courts in this treaty 
institution. The study of the EU has therefore often been the study of European law, and of the role of 
the European Court of Justice. Leading studies have examined how politicians, courts, and lawyers 
reacted to the Court’s extraordinary new doctrines at a time when the EU was still largely a trade regime 
(e.g. Weiler 1991; Burley and Mattli 1993; Alter 2001; Phelan 2015). Others have focused on 
contemporary questions such as the influence of European law in issue-areas as diverse as disability 
policy and women’s rights, and there is a lively debate about the degree to which the Court’s decisions 
vary according to the legal pressures placed on it by the European states (Cichowski 2007; Carrubba et 
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al. 2008; Kelemen 2011; Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012; Larsson and Naurin 2016). That special role of 
law and courts is commonly agreed, however, only to have been very partially set out in the founding 
Treaty, and instead to have been the creation of the Court of Justice itself, above all in its decisions in 
1963 and 1964. The study of the origins of the fundamental doctrines of the European legal order is 
therefore the study of a puzzle central to increasing our understanding of the mysterious organizing 
principles of the EU. 
The importance of this research question suggests the need for new investigative strategies. Research 
on courts at other times and places has frequently found that court decision-making can be explained by 
commitments that the judges in question had assumed prior to their appointment to the courts – as shown, 
for example, in the various ways that the United States Supreme Court was influenced by the individual 
background and circumstances of John Marshall, its Chief Justice between 1801 and 1835 (e.g. Hobson 
1996; White 2001; for the modern Supreme Court, e.g. Segal and Cover 1989). Here we will use 
overlooked sources to demonstrate that part of the answer to the question, where did the fundamental 
doctrines of the European legal order come from?, is that these doctrines as a group, and above all the 
European legal order’s comprehensive rejection of any methods of self-help reciprocity or retaliation by 
the European states, appear to be derived from the legal philosophy that Robert Lecourt, former French 
politician and one of the most influential judges on the Court in the 1960s and 1970s, developed in his 
early scholarship on French property disputes. This discovery has significant consequences for our 
understanding of what the dominant faction on the Court was attempting to achieve in its ‘legal 
revolution’ of 1963 and 1964, and therefore for our understanding of the essential organizing principles 
of the EU. 
(The European institutions have been renamed several times since 1958. This paper uses the expressions 
“European Union” and “European Community” interchangeably to describe the European treaty 
organization throughout the period from 1958 to the present day, “European Court of Justice”, “Court 
of Justice”, “European Court” and “ECJ” interchangeably to refer to the Court of Justice first provided 
for in the 1958 Treaty of Rome, and “European law”, “Community law” and “European Community 
law” interchangeably to describe the legal system established by the Treaties.) 
The fundamental doctrines of the European law 
By far the commonest approach to identifying the fundamental doctrines of the European legal order 
would be to refer to the doctrines of ‘direct effect’ and ‘supremacy’.2 The doctrine of direct effect was 
first set out in the Van Gend en Loos judgment, on 5th February 1963, where the Court of Justice 
proclaimed that the then European Community constituted a ‘new legal order’ (in the original French, 
“un nouvel ordre juridique”) and therefore that individuals, such as firms and private citizens, could 
directly vindicate their European law rights through litigation in national courts, which in turn were 
encouraged to submit questions about the interpretation of those European law rights to the European 
Court itself through the so-called ‘preliminary reference’ procedure set out in Article 177 of the Treaty 
of Rome. One year later, on 15th July 1964, the supremacy doctrine was set out in the Costa v. ENEL 
judgment, where the Court of Justice declared that national courts were required to apply directly 
effective European law obligations even if these were in conflict with the national legal obligations, 
including those contained in newly enacted national legislation. 
The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, and, therefore, the decisions of the Court in Van Gend and 
Costa, are often understood, as a pair, as the essential foundations of the European legal system, 
developed and extended to be sure in a stream of famous decisions throughout the 1960s and 1970s. By 
granting rights to individuals before national courts (direct effect), and by protecting those rights against 
conflicting national legislation (supremacy), the European Court to some extent marginalized the 
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enforcement mechanisms that had in fact been explicitly set out in the Treaty. Article 169 in particular 
had authorized the European Commission (the secretariat or bureaucracy established by the Treaty) to 
bring a member state before the Court of Justice, to obtain a declaration by the Court finding that the 
state had failed to fulfill its Treaty obligations. This mechanism however required business interests 
adversely affected by treaty violations to wait for the Commission to bring a member state before the 
European Court, with all the delays and frustrations involved, whereas the direct effect and supremacy 
doctrines provided an enforcement mechanism much more openly available to firms and individuals 
themselves and where enforcement was in the hands of a national court. The question ‘where did the 
fundamental doctrines of the European legal order come from?’ must therefore offer an answer to the 
question ‘where did the European law doctrines of direct effect and supremacy come from?’ 
This, however, is not the only way to identify the most fundamental doctrines of the European legal 
order. A long-standing alternative approach stresses European law’s persistent and comprehensive 
rejection of any form of self-help by the European states as a mechanism for enforcing European 
obligations. In general international law, the possible use of such self-help activities, whether described 
as ‘reciprocity’, ‘retaliation’, ‘countermeasures’, or (in trade-related treaty regimes) the ‘suspension of 
equivalent concessions’, often appear, despite the real economic disruptions and unfortunate diplomatic 
tensions involved in their use, to be an unavoidable necessity in dispute settlement arrangements (e.g. 
Zoller 1984). This is particularly true for the scenario where, after any treaty-based dispute resolution 
procedures have been finally completed, a state persists in defaulting on a treaty obligation. In such a 
case, its treaty partner states may themselves impose retaliatory penalties by reducing their own 
fulfillment of treaty obligations towards the defaulting state. Nonfulfillment of treaty obligations is 
therefore justified as a response to prior failures by other parties, and, after all, such self-help remedies 
can be imposed by other states even if the defaulting state does not cooperate in the acceptance of a 
penalty. Certainly, it is widely accepted that the dispute settlement systems of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and of many other trade treaties, require the ability to authorize such a self-help-
based ‘tit-for-tat’ retaliation mechanism ‘as a last resort’, and indeed a last resort whose presence 
pervades such trade systems as a whole (e.g. Bown 2009).  
Necessary to many forms of international law as such self-help forms of retaliation appear to be, 
however, such activities were comprehensively ruled out within the European legal order by the Court 
of Justice in its Dairy Products decision of 13th November 1964.3 In the words of the Court,  
“In [the defendants’] view, … international law allows a party, injured by the failure of another party 
to perform its obligations, to withhold performance of its own … However, this relationship between 
the obligations of parties cannot be recognized under Community law. … [T]he basic concept of the 
treaty requires that the Member States not take the law into their own hands.”  
or, in oft-repeated words of the original French,  
l'économie du traité comporte interdiction pour les états membres de se faire justice eux-mêmes. 
One of the benefits of the European legal order for the states and firms in the intra-European market, 
therefore, is that trading relationships are not threatened by the pervasive latent possibility of the 
authorization of retaliatory sanctions between the various states, as they are within the WTO and many 
other trade-related treaty systems.     
The principle announced in the Court’s 1964 Dairy Products decision must be considered 
“revolutionary”, explain Gradoni and Tanzi, and is indeed what makes European law “something new”, 
claims Weiler (Gradoni and Tanzi 2008; Weiler 1991: 2422; Phelan 2012). “Nothing is more alien to 
Community law than the idea of a measure of retaliation or reciprocity proper to classical public 
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international law”, declared the Court of Justice’s Advocate General Léger in 1995.4 Léger’s double 
description is an apt one, since neither international law nor the practice of states in international 
relations offers any clear line between reciprocity’s principle that I-am-doing-this-because-you-are-
doing-that and retaliation’s alternative formulation I-withholding-my-performance-of-this-to-punish-
you-for-not-doing-that. Given the essential role of such forms of self-help by states within many other 
treaty regimes, and in general international law, the emphasis on the fundamental nature of the doctrine 
announced in the Dairy Products decision is well justified. The question ‘where did the fundamental 
doctrines of the European legal order come from?’ must also include a discussion of the origins of the 
doctrine announced by the Court in the Dairy Products case.  
Explaining the origins of the fundamental doctrines of the European legal order 
Perhaps the place to start any discussion of the origins of these famous doctrines is to note that leading 
ECJ judges have often maintained that these doctrines were required by the Treaty of Rome, particularly 
the ringing call for ‘an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’ in the Treaty’s preamble, even 
if the Court itself had taken an active role in drawing these consequences from the Treaty texts. So 
Robert Lecourt, French judge on the Court from 1962 to 1976 and President of the Court between 1967 
and 1976, explained in his 1976 book L’Europe des Juges (‘The Judges’ Europe’) that the judge on the 
Court of Justice “could add nothing to the treaties, but should give them all their meaning and bring to 
its provisions all the useful consequences, explicit or implicit, that their letter and the spirit commanded.” 
(Lecourt 1976: 237). Lord Mackenzie-Stuart, British judge on the Court from 1973 to 1988 and 
President of the Court from 1984 to 1988, suggested an even more passive role when he responded to 
criticism that the Court itself had a policy of expanding the scope of the ‘direct effect’ doctrine, by 
claiming that “It is the Treaties and the subordinate legislation [rules produced by the European 
institutions] which have a policy, and which dictate the ends to be achieved. The Court only takes note 
of what has already been decided” (Mackenzie-Stuart 1977: 77). 
Many outside observers, however, reject the view that the Court’s revolutionary judgments in 1963 and 
1964, as well as the larger number of foundational decisions throughout the 1960s and 1970s, were 
straightforwardly required by the Treaty of Rome. Instead, it is widely accepted that the Court itself, far 
from adding ‘nothing’ to the Treaties, did indeed have a ‘policy’ during these years, and that this policy 
represented a choice by decision-makers on the Court to interpret the Treaty in a highly distinctive way. 
After all, as many scholars point out, the Treaty of Rome said nothing about the direct effect of Treaty 
provisions, nothing about the supremacy of European obligations within the national legal orders, and 
nothing about the Treaty’s rejection of classical international law-style retaliation or reciprocity between 
states. Even today new students of European law are often startled by the Treaty’s silence on such vital 
matters. The Treaty of Rome may have provided an important framework, but the Court itself is widely 
understood as the real ‘creator’ of the European legal order as it later developed (Weiler 1994: 512). 
While scholarship on the creation of the European legal order frequently acknowledges the remarkable 
initiatives taken by the Court in 1963 and 1964, however, for the most part this scholarship makes little 
attempt to offer a specific explanation of the origins of these new doctrines themselves. Perhaps 
inhibitions about inquiring too closely into officially secret judicial deliberations may have played a role 
here. In any event, many leading contributions to this literature instead take the Court’s decisions, and 
particularly its famous declarations on ‘direct effect’ and ‘supremacy’, not as outcomes that must 
themselves be explained, but rather as setting the stage for other research projects, most commonly the 
puzzle of why other actors came to accept the Court’s new doctrines.  
In political science explanations of European legal integration, for example, it is often understood that 
the Court of Justice’s behavior can be straightforwardly explained by self-interest – the Court’s incentive 
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to increase its legal authority. As Burley and Mattli write (and many others would agree) “It is obvious 
that any measures that succeed in raising the visibility, effectiveness, and scope of [European] law also 
enhance the prestige and power of the Court and its members.” (Burley and Mattli 1993: 64). The more 
challenging question, then, is why the European states, the national courts, firms, private lawyers, and 
legal academia came to accept these new doctrines, when their self-interest in the Court’s new doctrines 
was rather more ambiguous. After all, European law’s claim to hierarchical superiority (inherent in a 
‘supremacy’ doctrine) empowered the Court of Justice, but what interest did other actors have in 
accepting their resulting hierarchical subordination? To be sure, scholarship has put forward a range of 
interesting answers to this question, including an emphasis on the interest of ‘lower’ national courts in 
cooperating with the Court of Justice to gain powers over both politicians and ‘higher’ courts within 
their national jurisdictions, as well as the incentives for states to accept and manage such demanding 
treaty obligations derived from high levels of interdependence, intra-industry trade, and generous 
welfare states (Weiler 1991; Phelan 2015). Whatever answer is offered, however, such research agendas 
do not contribute to answering our particular question here, about the origins of these fundamental 
doctrines themselves. 
At times scholarship does suggest that a variety of background conditions may have facilitated the 
Court’s ground-breaking decisions. These include the possibility that the judges wished to produce 
concrete advances for ‘Europe’ at a time (the early 1960s) when French President Charles de Gaulle had 
loudly criticized the European institutions, and on the more strictly legal side, some would point to 
partial precursors in international law, including a 1928 opinion of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice discussing the direct effect of treaty obligations on the rights and duties of individuals5, and as 
well as the more widespread contemporary state practice allowing that treaty obligations could at times 
be enforced directly before national courts (Waelbroeck 1969: 161-188; Weiler 1991: 2424-2425; 
Davies 2012: 111). The Court of Justice’s famous decisions can even been be viewed as partially passive 
creations, with the Court reaching its judgments under the encouragement of the European Commission 
and in the light of the solutions suggested by the disputes brought to it by national courts through the 
preliminary reference procedure (Rasmussen 2014: 154). Such legal precursors are certainly interesting, 
but neither provide clear analogies to the European legal order as it came to be developed, with a much 
broader scope for ‘direct effect’ than was accepted in mainstream approaches to international law, with 
a treaty-based tribunal itself deciding on the (continuously expanding) scope of direct effect, and on the 
explicit supremacy of treaty obligations over conflicting national legislation regardless of the principles 
of national constitutional law. It must also be true that the Court was encouraged along its way by the 
European Commission and various litigants, although not every judge would have accepted the most 
ambitious arguments put before the Court and indeed the principles announced in the Court’s decisions 
often went beyond those required to address the disputes in front of it.  
Closest to addressing our specific question are the contributions to the “new history” of European law, 
whose leading scholars – Davies, Lindseth, Vauchez, and particularly Rasmussen on the Court itself – 
have made discovery after discovery about the early years of the European legal order (e.g. Davies 2012; 
Lindseth 2010; Rasmussen 2010b; Vauchez 2015; also e.g. Phelan 2014 putting the question of conflicts 
between EU treaty obligations and national constitutional rights (the 'So-Lange' debate) within the 
context of conflicts between the obligations of other treaties and constitutional rights in postwar 
Germany and Italy). One particular strand of this scholarship has attempted to uncover the varying roles 
of the Court’s judges themselves during these years, with some impressive results. Via information 
obtained from the long-retired ‘legal attachés’ (similar to the ‘clerks’ of US court judges), we know now 
that the famous Van Gend en Loos decision which established European law’s ‘direct effect’ doctrine 
was the occasion of a behind-the-scenes struggle, between the ambitious decision supported by Italian 
judge Antonio Trabucchi and the then newly-appointed French judge Robert Lecourt, on the one hand, 
and the then President of the Court, Dutch judge Andreas Donner, who initially supported a more limited 
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decision, on the other (Rasmussen 2008: 94-95). Without the nomination of Lecourt as judge in 1962, 
therefore, the Court would likely have refused to declare the direct effect of European law in its Van 
Gend judgment in 1963 (Rasmussen 2008: 98). As well as demonstrating that judges on the Court of 
Justice did indeed disagree among themselves about the meaning of the Treaty and how best to respond 
to the disputes put before it, this research has therefore revealed the identity of those judges who were, 
more than others, closely associated with these revolutionary new doctrines. We also know that Lecourt, 
in particular, seems to have become highly influential on the Court as time went on, culminating with 
his own election to the Presidency of the Court from 1967 to 1976 (Edward 2001: 181). Another 
prominent judge, Pierre Pescatore, who joined the Court of Justice in 1967, even talked of the ‘Lecourt 
years’ of the Court of Justice, from 1962 onwards, as a ‘jurisprudential miracle’ (Pescatore 2005: 595).  
With the important exception of the identification of the judicial ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the struggle 
over Van Gend en Loos, and the long-term influence of Lecourt on the Court, however, little progress 
has been made on our particular question. To be sure, there are strong reasons why such a research 
agenda is a difficult one. Above all, the Court of Justice (unlike, in this respect, the United States 
Supreme Court) produces only a single judgment presented as produced by the Court as a whole, with 
no individually signed dissenting or concurring opinions. Thus the individuality of the judges’ 
participation in the Court’s decisions remains hidden. The judges themselves are sworn to secrecy about 
their internal deliberations, and both judges and their assistants remain discrete about the internal 
functioning of the Court.6  
In the case of Robert Lecourt in particular, apparently the leading judge on the Court throughout this 
period, the difficulties are further multiplied. Lecourt published no memoirs of his time on the Court. 
Historians have not written his biography, in long form or short. Lecourt’s own legal scholarship, prior 
to his appointment to the Court, did not focus on international law or ‘European federalism’, but 
addressed issues of French civil law – he wrote a dissertation on litigation seeking to reestablish 
possession of real estate, for example (Lecourt 1931). His 1976 book on European law, L’Europe des 
Juges is mostly bland, largely avoids theoretical debate, and was aimed squarely at popularizing 
European law with ‘legal practitioners’, that is to say, with national lawyers and judges who might apply 
European law in national litigation (Lecourt 1976; as noted in contemporary reviews, e.g. Schermers 
1977). As for his private papers, Lecourt apparently destroyed them prior to his death (Rasmussen 
2010a: 654 ft 58).  
On the crucial issue of Lecourt’s detailed opinions about ‘Community law’ before the Court’s legal 
revolution, previous scholarship has uncovered only “two important traces” of “Lecourt’s legal thinking 
before Van Gend en Loos”, one a 1962 article by Lecourt in Le Monde, and the other a decision by the 
Court of Justice in December 1962, whose wording (so fellow ECJ judge Pescatore conjectured in 
hindsight) Lecourt may perhaps have influenced (Rasmussen 2010b: 77 ft 124).7 We might add that 
studies of appointments to the Court sometimes use Lecourt as an example of a judge with a ‘political 
career’ background, rather than an ‘academic’, ‘civil servant’, or ‘national judge’ background (Chalmers 
2015: 58). Lecourt had indeed been Minister of Justice several times in Fourth Republic France, as well 
as Minister of State under de Gaulle, and was a long-time Christian Democratic politician and 
campaigner for European unity.8    
There is, therefore, considerable research attempting to explain the origins of the remarkable legal and, 
frankly, political authority of today’s Court of Justice. That authority is usually traced back to a set of 
revolutionary decisions that the Court made in 1963 and 1964. That raises the question of where, in turn, 
the contents of those decisions came from? They were not required by the European Treaties themselves. 
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We do know a little about the struggle within the Court to produce those decisions, a struggle won over 
the long term, most obviously, by judge Lecourt. But – whether in law, political science, or in historical 
studies – that is where the trail runs cold. Citing comprehensive lack of any available sources that can 
identify the prior and relevant legal or political commitments held by Lecourt (beyond his being a ‘pro-
European’) or of any other of the leading judges, the Court’s trail-blazing decisions appear to come from 
‘the law’, or perhaps from self-interested motivations of the Court itself in aggrandizing its position. 
This impasse is profoundly unsatisfactory. First and foremost, we remain ignorant of the specific 
objectives of the dominant faction on the Court during the all-important founding years of what is now 
perhaps the world’s most significant and innovative international organization, as current scholarship 
rests on very limited information about the legal goals and principles that these judges brought to the 
Court. Furthermore, even if we allow that the judges taking control of the Court in 1963 were indeed 
‘pro-Europeans’, a considerable gap remains between possessing a ‘pro-European’ perspective, no 
matter how strongly felt, and creating an effective treaty-based legal system from the laconic provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome. The Van Gend en Loos decision of 1963 was not just ‘pro-European’, or even a 
mere derivative of the question posed to the European Court by the Dutch national court in the case. 
Rather, it was informed by a distinctive understanding of how a ‘new legal order’ could be established. 
The same applies to all the great ECJ decisions of the founding period – the texts of these decisions 
advance a perspective on the role of individuals, the European Court, national courts, states, and the 
ways which European law would distinguish itself from ordinary forms of international law, which 
demonstrates a considerable coherence over many years. It thus seems highly likely the principles and 
legal doctrines made use of by the Court in its revolutionary decisions derived, at least in important part, 
from legal principles and doctrines with which the most influential figures on the Court during these 
years were already familiar and therefore able to turn productively to the European task at hand as the 
opportunity arose.  
This apparent impasse however suggests its own solution. By identifying the especially influential role 
of Robert Lecourt on the Court from 1962 to 1976, there is reason now to focus our attention on Lecourt, 
in particular, as we attempt to investigate the origins of the European Court’s major doctrines.  
Our approach will therefore be to turn to various of Lecourt’s less well-known publications to attempt 
to identify distinctive aspects of his legal philosophy, both after and, crucially, before his appointment 
to the Court of Justice. These publications sometimes address legal topics apparently far from the 
concerns of the Court of Justice, or describe the meaning of the foundational doctrines of European law 
in unfamiliar ways. We will be relying on examples of both of these types to demonstrate an important 
aspect of Lecourt’s legal philosophy over a period of several decades. 
Lecourt’s Legal Philosophy before the Court of Justice 
The essential source for any understanding of Lecourt’s legal philosophy before he joined the Court of 
Justice must be his dissertation on an aspect of French law, a specific instrument of litigation in disputes 
over real property, completed at the University of Caen in 1931 (Lecourt 1931).9 The underlying 
disputes in question, unsurprisingly, covered a full range of mischiefs that can occur between neighbors, 
between occupiers of a property and the property’s owners, and between those in possession of real 
estate and governmental authorities. The examples that Lecourt discussed included the construction of 
barriers to block access to a road leading to a property, the flooding of lands by a neighbor inserting a 
channel in a bank without authorization, the prevention of use of allegedly communal lands by a local 
mayor, and even the occupation of an island by agents of the French state itself (Lecourt 1931: 196, 216, 
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191, 193). Each of these incidents had led to litigation, of course, and court decisions on these disputes 
provided the essential empirical content of Lecourt’s study. 
The specific legal instrument that Lecourt chose as his subject was the so-called l’action en 
réintégrande, or réintégrande, a legal action to secure recovery of property. It was, and indeed is, a legal 
instrument by which a person who has been violently dispossessed of real property can ask a court to 
require that the property be reinstated to them. The fact that the réintégrande can be decided in a fast 
and simple procedure, and the property ordered restored to the dispossessed party, prior to any litigation 
on the merits makes it a powerful instrument in determining the status quo of possession before any 
more fundamental litigation (Lecourt 1931: 11, 20).  
Disaggregated into its various parts, the réintégrande required a person to be in possession of a property 
(“the fact of possession”), and an act by another party that has violently dispossessed them of the 
property (the “act of dispossession”). As is commonly the case for a doctoral dissertation, this topic 
allowed for a degree of theoretical debate, as different approaches to understanding the meaning of the 
réintégrande put varying emphases on the two essential elements that made up the conditions for its use.  
The ‘classic theory’ of the réintégrande as Lecourt described it placed considerable emphasis on the 
qualifying condition of the ‘possessor’ as such. Seeing the foundation of the réintégrande as a legal 
instrument in the protection of possession itself, such scholarly discussions saw the réintégrande as only 
to be made available to a ‘true possessor’ (‘le vrai possesseur’) of a property, for example those who 
had been in uninterrupted possession for at least a year (Lecourt 1931: 14). Such approaches tended to 
see the réintégrande as belonging essentially to a family of actions possessoires, ‘legal actions related 
to possession’ often used in property disputes. 
This understanding of the réintégrande Lecourt rejected. Empirically, he claimed that discussions of the 
réintégrande in leading scholarship found little support in the jurisprudence of the modern French courts 
(Lecourt 1931: 17, 279). The decisions of the courts were all-important here since the réintégrande was 
not itself well-defined in any legislative text. Viewed in the light of the decisions of the courts rather 
than scholarship then, then, so Lecourt argued, the foundation of the réintégrande was as a right held by 
any possessor against any party who had violently usurped it, connecting it with the réintégrande’s 
canon law origins as a mechanism for remedying property seizures in the disorder and private wars of 
France in the Middle Ages prior to the effective development of the French state (Lecourt 1931: 11, 
similarly 241-242, 279-280) as well as more contemporary problems such as ‘private justice’ employed 
by landlords whose interests had been adversely affected by wartime restrictions on property rights 
(Lecourt 1931: 20). Thus Lecourt set out to provide a theoretical understanding of the réintégrande that 
both matched, and could be used to further extend, contemporary practice.  
Addressing the various conditions for the exercise of the réintégrande, Lecourt first discussed decisions 
of the French courts on who could be considered a ‘possessor’. He demonstrated that the courts found 
that the réintégrande could be used by almost any person in possession of a property, even a ‘precarious 
possessor’ (Lecourt 1931: 15). Lecourt’s analysis then turned to the act of dispossession. Here he 
demonstrated that decisions of the courts allowed that the réintégrande be used against any act of 
dispossession involving, in the common expression, ‘violences et voies de faits’ (‘violence and assault’). 
Thus the réintégrande could be employed against the property’s owner, against the property’s ‘true 
possessor’, against third parties, against local mayors and communes, even against the French state 
(Lecourt 1931: 18, 16, 222-223). It was thus a personal action (action personelle), against the individual, 
whatsoever their quality, who had violently deprived the actual possessor of the enjoyment of the 
property (Lecourt 1931: 19).  
Lecourt was careful to note that the frequent statements by the French courts that the réintégrande was 
applicable where dispossession had occurred by violences et voies de faits did not in fact require any 
violence as such to have occurred (Lecourt 1931: 207). There was no need for “blood to be spilled” 
(Lecourt 1931: 212). The essential issue was rather that the dispossession had occurred arbitrarily, and 
that the author of the usurpation ‘wanted to take justice into their own hands’, or in Lecourt’s original 
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French “qu'il ait voulu se faire justice à lui-même” (Lecourt 1931: 214). Lecourt felt that this expression 
(used by the courts but contained in no legislative text) best captured the logic of the réintégrande as 
the courts actually practiced it (Lecourt 1931: 236). The rejection of such self-help in these property 
disputes was not just a moral principle but also the principle underlying all public order, as indeed many 
courts insisted in their réintégrande-related judgments (Lecourt 1931: 241). 
At the end of the dissertation, Lecourt forthrightly advanced his own new conception of the 
réintégrande, comparing and contrasting it with a variety of other instruments of French law. This legal 
action was, he said, not an action possessoire, except indirectly (Lecourt 1931: 244). In fact, the 
essential, and indeed only, basis of the réintégrande was that individuals should not have the right to 
use arbitrary self-help to dispossess others in property disputes. Lecourt concludes this discussion of 
French law by admiring the way in which the réintégrande had been developed by the French courts 
themselves, relying on no authoritative legislative texts – “a remarkable purely jurisprudential 
construction necessitated by equity and circumstances when texts are silent or imprecise”, as he put it, 
even though, as he acknowledged, the French legal system only envisaged the courts as ‘interpreters of 
law’ and not as ‘elaborators of rules’ (Lecourt 1931: 236, 282).  
Lecourt’s contribution to scholarship on the réintégrande, therefore, was to contest the scholarly 
consensus that it should be understood as a mechanism to protect the true possessors of a property, and 
to declare instead that it was a creation of the courts to prevent public order being undermined by those 
who would take the law into their own hands. This contribution has been acknowledged in later French 
legal scholarship, with Michelet in 1973, for example, attributing to Lecourt the view that “la 
réintégrande est fondée sur le principe qu'il est interdit de se faire justice à soi-même” (Michelet 1973: 
180). 
Our particular interest of course, is not in legal scholarship about approaches to property disputes in 
early twentieth century France, but in the sources of the fundamental doctrines of the European legal 
order. We have defined those three doctrines as the direct effect of European law in the national legal 
orders, the supremacy of European law over conflicting national law, and the absolute rejection of any 
form of self-help behaviors, retaliatory or reciprocal, by the European member states. As should now be 
evident, the latter doctrine, the comprehensive rejection of any form of self-help in European law is 
directly foreshadowed by Lecourt’s insistence that the essential foundation of the réintégrande was a 
comprehensive rejection any form of self-help in property disputes.   
This link is reinforced by a striking passage on the last two pages of Lecourt’s dissertation. Like many 
doctoral students, having completed nearly three hundred pages of technical discussion, Lecourt felt 
himself entitled to conclude, with a flourish, on a wider vision:10 
The repression of violence is therefore the basis of law. So much for domestic law. 
This principle is so essential to the life of society, it is so much the foundation of all law, that it is the 
object today of a considerable expansion in international law. It has been unanimously recognized that 
violence between peoples has even more disastrous consequences than violence between individuals. 
International law is virtually in its origins, starting at the point where domestic law began. 
States have agreed to outlaw violence now and put the "war outside the law." And these ideas are 
progressing every day. Already international organizations have been created to limit and if possible 
prevent violent conflicts between peoples and the right to substitute violence with law. The very 
principle that once stopped private wars we use today to prevent world wars. This is the prohibition for 
anyone, individuals or nations, to resort to violence and the obligation of all to present themselves before 
a judge instead of taking the law into their own hands. This principle has always developed in parallel 
with the Law. Where the Law extends to a new area, this principle appears as a foundation. Its extension 
is so great and so visible that although once limited to conflicts between private interests it now 
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constantly tends to apply to disputes between peoples. This has been reflected in international law 
especially during the last decade through the creation of international organizations: the League of 
Nations, international conferences (disarmament conferences), international tribunals that play an 
important role in the relations between States. These organizations are called upon to prohibit violence 
among peoples and nations just as it has long been forbidden to individuals to take the law into their 
own hands. Finally, they tend to replace the use of violence with international arbitration. This is the 
singular vitality of the great legal principle of which the ‘réintégrande’ is the sharpest application and 
to which the principle of protection of possession on the classic understanding appears of only minor 
importance. (Lecourt 1931: 284-285) 
Lecourt had therefore managed to work his way from a discussion of property disputes between country 
neighbours to a perspective on greatest challenges of international law. Not for Lecourt the 
commonplace discussions of international lawyers that self-help countermeasures are a necessary “fact 
of life” that serve a vital function in encouraging treaty partners to fulfil their legal obligations, or indeed 
any recognition that self-help, even of a tempered and regulated variety, must of necessity continue to 
play a larger role in international than domestic society (e.g. Simma 1994: 102). Lecourt declares simply 
that states in international organizations must give up the use of violence and self-help just as individuals 
are forced to do before the law within a state, mirroring the ability of developing nation states to put an 
end to self-help within their own territories.  
The European legal order’s doctrine rejecting any form of self-help between the European states, first 
announced in the Dairy Products case, therefore seems likely to find a signficant part of its origins in 
the legal philosophy of Robert Lecourt. Frankly put, the essential legal principle advanced by the Court 
in the Dairy Products case was not contained in the Treaty of Rome, but was set out extensively in 
Lecourt’s own early legal scholarship, above all in its approach to French property law but also in its 
brief discussion of international law. We can even see strong similarities in the language employed here 
by Lecourt in 1931 and by the Court of Justice in the Dairy Products case in 1964. In the Dairy Products, 
the European Court said of the Treaty of Rome that  
“l' économie du traité comporte interdiction pour les états membres de se faire justice eux-mêmes” [the 
logic of the treaty requires a prohibition on the member states taking the law into their own hands] 
And in his dissertation, Lecourt had written that international organizations were called upon 
“à interdire aux nations, comme il est depuis longtemps défendu aux particuliers, de se faire justice à 
soi-même” [to prohibit to nations, just as it has long been prohibited to individuals, to take the law into 
their own hands] 
We will now turn to discuss how Lecourt’s legal philosophy may also have contributed to the other 
doctrines announced by the Court in 1963 and 1964.  
Lecourt’s Understanding of the Relationship between Direct Effect, Supremacy, and the 
Rejection of Self-Help by the European States 
If the connection between the Dairy Products case and the legal philosophy that Lecourt had developed 
in his early scholarship largely speaks for itself, the connection between Lecourt’s legal philosophy and 
the doctrines announced in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL will require a little more elaboration.  
The starting point for our discussion must be that, in current scholarship on the European legal order, it 
is common for the direct effect and supremacy doctrines to be described as instruments completely 
separate from any inter-state relationship within the EU (e.g. Burley and Mattli 1993; Rudden and 
Phelan 1997). The direct role that these doctrines give to private individuals and national courts in the 
enforcement of European law is therefore understood as empowering those actors in themselves, as well 
as, of course, increasing the binding power of European law itself. As Lecourt himself wrote in L’Europe 
des Juges, “When the individual applies to a judge to ensure that their treaty rights are recognized, they 
are not acting in their own interest alone, but by this behavior the individual becomes an auxiliary agent 
Legal Philosophy of Robert Lecourt 
11 
of the Community” (Lecourt 1976: 260). This role of national courts often remains distinct from, and 
understood as having little relevance for the relationship between, say, France and Germany within the 
EU. In as much as direct effect and supremacy are understood to involve a direct relationship with a 
state authority, it is often understood to be the individual’s relationship with their own state – a Dutch 
firm suing the Dutch state in the Dutch courts, for example, to ensure the proper implementation of a 
European obligation – that is most obviously implicated, rather than any cross-border relationship 
between the European states.  
 Now if scholarship on the direct effect and supremacy of European law tends to view these doctrines 
as empowering individuals and national courts without any direct link to inter-state politics, scholarship 
discussing the possible role of national court enforcement in other treaty systems tends by contrast to 
add a further observation: granting a direct role for domestic courts in the enforcement of treaty 
obligations is recognized as a mechanism to allow a treaty system to do without enforcement by inter-
state retaliation and reciprocity.  
To see why this is, recall the situation in which retaliatory measures can be authorized within the WTO 
as a prominent example of a well-developed trade-related treaty regime. The essential scenario is one 
where a state persists with treaty-inconsistent policies even after the WTO’s dispute settlement processes 
have, finally and authoritatively, found it in default. Retaliation by other states may then be justified as 
a ‘last resort’, because the outcomes of the WTO’s dispute settlement processes remain ‘declaratory’, 
with no automatic effect on the internal policy-making of the defaulting state. However, if a direct 
enforcement role is taken on by national courts within a treaty state, particularly if those courts have a 
direct means of communication with treaty-based dispute settlement institutions (as national courts 
within the EU have with the ECJ through the ‘preliminary reference’ mechanism), then the outcomes of 
treaty-based dispute settlement processes are no longer merely ‘declaratory’, external to the legal and 
policy-making systems of the treaty state, but are instead automatically applied and embedded within 
the system of making and enforcing domestic law. Domestic court enforcement of treaty obligation 
therefore remedies the key weakness of international law, and international tribunals, at exactly the point 
at which reciprocal or retaliatory measures between states might otherwise become justified.11  
The role of domestic court enforcement of treaty obligations, or direct effect for short, as a mechanism 
for removing the use of inter-state retaliation as a method of enforcing treaties is widely recognized in 
scholarship. In the NAFTA environmental ‘side agreement’, treaty obligations are enforced against the 
US by Canada by threats of trade retaliation, but against Canada by the US through use of the Canadian 
domestic courts, explicitly as a substitute for such retaliation (Mayer 1998: 166). In debates about 
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reforming the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor to today’s WTO, Tumlir was 
one of the first to argue that, although many claimed that international trade law “can only be enforced 
as international law has always been enforced, by threats of retaliation”, “individual rights” and “the 
courts” should be recognized as an alternative way to “bring the internationally-agreed rules to bear on” 
national policy-making (Tumlir 1983: 400-401, 407). Perhaps most compellingly, in the debate over 
whether the outcomes of WTO dispute settlement processes should receive ‘direct effect’, and therefore 
domestic court enforcement, within the EU itself (in the EU’s capacity as a unitary trade actor vis-à-vis 
the world outside Europe) members of the European Court have straightforwardly discussed the 
possibility of direct effect of WTO obligations as an alternative to enforcement through WTO-
authorized retaliation. The Court of Justice’s Advocate General Maduro argued against granting ‘direct 
effect’ to WTO obligations within the EU because, he said, the EU “remains free to make the political 
choice to lay itself open … to retaliatory measures authorized by” the WTO.12 Domestic court 
enforcement of treaty obligations therefore has a specific cross-border impact (Phelan 2016). And in 
that way, the direct effect and supremacy doctrines are also revealed as related to the legal philosophy 
that Lecourt developed in his analysis of the réintégrande, because their function appears directly allied 
to Lecourt’s interest in the suppression of self-help.  
This might be enough to demonstrate that the legal philosophy of Robert Lecourt is likely to have been 
an important source behind all three of the major doctrines declared by the Court of Justice in 1963 and 
1964. That assessment would, however, be further reinforced if we can show that Lecourt himself 
understood that there was a logical and causal connection between these three doctrines. After all, much 
European law scholarship tends to avoid drawing such a connection, and Lecourt himself does not make 
any such link in his best-known book, L’Europe des Juges, or in many of his other discussions of 
European law over the years.   
Despite this, it turns out that on at least three occasions, Lecourt offered accounts of European law’s 
most fundamental doctrines which linked the supremacy and direct effect doctrines, on the one hand, 
with the European legal order’s rejection of international law-style self-help reciprocity and retaliation 
on the other. Where before we looked at Lecourt’s legal scholarship written before the Second World 
War, we will now examine examples of Lecourt’s writings from the 1960s and later, after his 
appointment to the Court.   
The most important example comes from early 1965, when Lecourt published a short paper on “The 
Judicial Dynamic in the Building of Europe” (Lecourt 1965). After referring to the role of law and courts 
in the unification of states in France and Germany (Lecourt 1965: 20), Lecourt offered an explanation 
and assessment of the development of the European legal order including its most famous cases. As we 
read, remember that the ‘decision of 5 February 1963’ is Van Gend en Loos, the ‘decision of 15 July 
1964’ is Costa v. ENEL, and the ‘decision of 13 November 1964’ is the Dairy Products case: 
Therefore the Court was led to conduct a sort of x-ray analysis of the Treaties to discover the solution 
to certain legal cases. … The result of this is that individuals can invoke a direct right to ensure the 
respect of the directly applicable provisions of the treaties. This right was disputed. But the Court finally 
observed that in instituting certain obligations in relation to individuals the Common Market should 
also inevitably confer on them “rights that enter into their judicial patrimony” (decision of 5 February 
1963) and which should be protected by national courts. 
But a delicate problem emerged …: what is then the authority of the common law in the face of national 
law? … The future of Europe would depend on the Court’s solution to this serious problem. 
… To decide such a finding in respect of the Treaty, it was necessary to analyze its terms and spirit. 
That is what the Court did, in judging that the texts “make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to 
accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on a 
basis of reciprocity”. Otherwise the law derived from the Treaty would not be able to “vary from one 
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state to another” without provoking prohibited discriminations or even putting the goals of the Treaty 
itself in danger”. The law common to six states “could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions, 
however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis 
of the Community itself being called into question”. No unilateral legal act of a state “can prevail against 
the Treaties” (decision of 15 July 1964) because the States “have renounced the ability to take the law 
into their own hands” (decision of 13 November 1964). [underline added]13 
In this passage, written right at the time of the Court of Justice’s legal revolution, Lecourt drew a direct 
connection, bolstered by explicit citations to the Court’s judgments, between direct effect, supremacy, 
and the European legal order’s rejection of self-help methods of enforcement: Van Gend en Loos and 
Costa v. ENEL were required because of the rejection of self-help in the Court’s Dairy Products 
judgment, or, as we now know, they were required by the legal philosophy that Lecourt had developed 
in his early scholarship on the réintégrande.   
The second example is contained in the final paragraph of Lecourt’s speech, in 1968, marking the 10th 
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. There Lecourt talked about “the reappearance, at a new level, of the 
unifying role of a court with jurisdiction to ensure a uniform rule of law that has so often been seen in 
the history of nations”. Lecourt summarized the progress of European law as Europe’s “peoples making 
substantial progress in civilization between themselves by renouncing self-help methods of obtaining 
justice through obedience to a law that is agreed in common”14 , and concluded with the declaration that 
“European Community law … does not present itself merely as the ‘rules of the game’ for the 
relationships between state powers, but as an authentic law, applied judicially, to which the individual 
person can himself have access” (Lecourt 1968: 22-23).  
The third example is in a book chapter that Lecourt published in 1991, in retirement and at the age of 
eighty-three, perhaps his last academic publication on European law. There Lecourt offered very 
distinctive answer to the question, what would European law have become without Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa v. ENEL (Lecourt 1991)? He focused the weaknesses of the Article 169 procedure – the 
procedure originally laid out in the Treaty allowing the Commission to take the member states to the 
Court of Justice to obtain a declaratory judgment finding a state in default. Lecourt explained that the 
weakness of this procedure was something “legally more serious” than the much discussed ‘delays’ in 
waiting for the Commission to bring a member state before the Court (Lecourt 1991: 358-359). Lecourt 
highlighted the scenario where “despite an ECJ decision finding that it had failed to fulfill its obligation, 
the State does not take any effort to take measures to execute the judgment of the Court … nothing 
would prevent a defaulting State from continuing to enjoy all the advantages of the Treaty”, since the 
Treaty provided for no coercive measures for addressing such a situation.15 This scenario would have 
put at risk “the principle of reciprocity between the member States” and the principle that the European 
states could not “hide behind the failure of another State to justify its own irregularities”. 16 The reason 
why this situation did not become alarming, Lecourt wrote, is that the principles of direct effect and 
supremacy allowed economic actors direct access to means of ensuring respect for the Treaty. Read with 
an awareness of the enforcement mechanisms of other trade regimes, where this is just the scenario 
where a retaliatory ‘suspension of concessions’ between states on reciprocity grounds would often be 
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justified, Lecourt’s 1991 paper connects Van Gend and Costa with the European legal order’s rejection 
of all threat or use of ‘self-help’ reciprocity or retaliation mechanisms, and, indeed, demonstrates that 
Lecourt’s thinking about international law shows a certain consistency of approach all the way from 
1931 to 1991. 
If the last section showed that the doctrine declared by the Court in Dairy Products can be 
straightforwardly connected with Lecourt’s rejection of any form of self-help enforcement in domestic 
or international law, this section has demonstrated that the doctrines declared by the Court in Van Gend 
and Costa can also be connected with Lecourt’s rejection of any form of self-help enforcement in 
domestic and international law, because granting direct effect to treaty obligations in domestic courts 
(and protecting them from conflicting national law) is an instrument by which such self-help 
enforcement mechanisms can be removed from a treaty system, as shown both by contemporary 
scholarly debates and, indeed, repeatedly, in the writings of Robert Lecourt himself.17  
Conclusion  
Where did the fundamental doctrines of European law come from? To accounts that emphasize that 
certain intrepid national courts were willing to make preliminary references to the European Court, that 
the European Commission encouraged the Court to ambitious decisions, and that a bold pro-European 
faction that included Robert Lecourt was able to seize control of the Court’s decision-making in 1963, 
we can now add that the legal philosophy that Lecourt had developed at length in his scholarship on 
French law included a profound rejection of any form of self-help, a principle relevant to all three of the 
Court’s great decisions in 1963 and 1964. Moving beyond the faint traces of Lecourt’s “legal thinking” 
identified in previous scholarship, we have found, on the Court itself, a judge whose early scholarship 
on the réintégrande had developed goals and principles which, when combined with other elements in 
Court’s environment, could be used to declare and develop a coherent legal order that rejected any use 
of inter-state retaliation and instead enforced its obligations through the domestic courts of the 
participating states. Finally, we cannot overlook the fact that Lecourt’s scholarship on French law 
revealed him to be an open admirer of the development of ambitious legal principles by courts 
themselves, when legislative texts were “silent or ambiguous”, and in response to economic and social 
needs, an approach which the European Court embraced whole-heartedly in its “Lecourt years”. 
It therefore appears that one of the major objectives of the dominant faction on the Court in 1963 and 
1964 was a comprehensive rejection of any form of reciprocal or retaliatory self-help between the 
European states, and that that objective was directly connected to the European Court’s doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy. It is fair to say that such an understanding of the fundamental principles of 
European law is rare indeed in both legal and political science scholarship on the creation of the 
European legal order, where it is common to omit any discussion of Dairy Products case or the principle 
that the Court set out in it, and even among such scholarship that does mention the Dairy Products 
decision, seldom is this principle granted any particular prominence or connected to the direct effect 
doctrine in the way that Lecourt at times described it.18 It may be time to reconsider these approaches in 
light of our new information. On the other hand, the evidence presented here must reinforce the claims 
of that strand of literature that has asserted, even in advance of our improved knowledge of Lecourt’s 
own legal philosophy, that the principle announced in the Dairy Products case – the comprehensive 
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rejection of self-help reciprocity and retaliation – was at the heart of the Court’s ambitions in its creation 
of the European legal order (e.g. in political science: Phelan 2015; in law: Gradoni and Tanzi 2008; and 
for the seminal paper on Dairy Products, Simma 1985).  
The match between Lecourt’s legal philosophy and the revolutionary decisions of the Court under his 
influence also contributes an alternative perspective to the many discussions of the role of self-interest 
during the development of the European legal order. On the one hand, the behaviors of the Court of 
Justice may perhaps appear somewhat less self-interested, as its major decisions appear to have been 
guided by a philosophy of law that had developed far in advance of the opportunity that arose for Lecourt 
to apply it to the Court’s decision-making. On the other, the behaviors of the European states and other 
actors in accepting the Court’s ‘new legal order’ may appear somewhat more compatible with their self-
interest since they and their businesses benefitted enormously from the establishment of a European 
market that operated without the self-help reciprocity and retaliation mechanisms so common in other 
trade treaties. To be sure, the European legal order did imply elements of hierarchy benefitting the Court 
itself, and elements of subordination affecting the European states and national courts, so the traditional 
interest analysis may well explain some of the hesitations of state policy-makers and others, but it needs 
to be combined with an understanding of the concrete outcome that the Court was in the process of 
achieving. Much more than the lawyers and courts, European state policy-makers and their business 
interests are the real beneficiaries of the end of self-help retaliation between the European states, just as, 
in the example that Lecourt liked to invoke over the decades, the people of France, and not just French 
courts and lawyers, were the real beneficiaries of the development of the French state in ways that put 
an end to disorders associated with private feuds and arbitrary use of self-help during the Middle Ages. 
Of course, compared to what we would like to know about the origins of the European legal order, we 
still have much to learn. Outside the Court itself, we still need to know more about the role of states, 
national courts, legal networks, academia, and pioneering individual litigators in accepting, resisting, 
promoting, and employing European law doctrines and litigation. The Court’s decision-making process 
continues to hide the specific contributions, or objections, of individual judges to ground-breaking 
decisions, and former judges often remain reticent about discussing the internal politics of the Court. If 
here we have taken a large step forward in identifying connections between the content of the Court’s 
decisions and the early legal scholarship of one of its most prominent judges, the same research approach 
(a focus on their early writings, even when not directly addressing European law) can also be applied to 
other ECJ judges, as well as the wider range of influential lawyers associated with the Court, and indeed 
to research on courts and judges in other contexts. We would also still like to know more about the life 
and career of Lecourt himself, and how this may have influenced his activity on the Court.19 It is 
unfortunate that leading European judges, including Lecourt himself, have destroyed large quantities of 
private papers. This remains a challenging environment to progress research, where even partial steps 
forward are to be welcomed.  
We can perhaps now however speculate about a more specific reason, other than a concern for the 
secrecy of judicial deliberations, why Lecourt destroyed his private papers and indeed why, after his 
1965 France-Forum article, Lecourt never again (so far as we are aware) drew such special attention to 
the Dairy Products decision, or so explicitly connected European law’s direct effect and supremacy 
doctrines to the Dairy Products case. After all, Lecourt’s public defenses of the Court’s behavior, 
particularly in L’Europe des Juges, rested heavily on the claim that the Court’s new doctrines were 
merely the correct interpretation of the Treaty. Such a posture might have appeared less plausible, to 
some at least, if very direct connections between the Court’s revolutionary doctrines and the doctoral 
dissertation of its then most influential judge had come to wider attention. The cost of Lecourt’s 
discretion on this point may have been a confusion about the purposes of, and relationship between, the 
European legal order’s fundamental doctrines that has persisted to the current day.  
                                                 
19
 This paper is part of a continuing project focusing on Lecourt.  
William Phelan 
Finally, this discussion offers something new to our understanding of the essential organizing principles 
of perhaps the contemporary world’s most innovative international organization, the European Union. 
The centrality of law and courts in the functioning of the EU is accurately recognized in its common 
classification as a Rechtsgemeinschaft, or ‘Community of law’. There is, however, a particular 
advantage to an understanding of the EU’s organizing principles that is framed in terms of the EU’s 
approach to self-help by the states that have joined it. After all, self-help by states is recognized as an 
essential feature of many leading approaches to international politics, both in theoretical discussions on 
the ‘balance of power’ and on tit-for-tat cooperation, and in the flourishing empirical literatures on 
military actions and on retaliation-based dispute settlement within trade regimes (e.g. Waltz 1979; 
Axelrod 1984; Biddle 2004; Bown 2009). So a characterization of the EU as ‘a demanding treaty 
organization that prohibits any form of self-help behavior between its member states in the same way 
that self-help has long been prohibited to private individuals within well-developed nation states’, both 
correctly identifies the ambition of the European legal order within the context of these important wider 
debates, and draws directly on the words that Robert Lecourt (Lecourt 1931: 284), leading judge of the 
European Court, used to describe the purpose of international organizations when he first set out his 
legal philosophy. 
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